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ABSTRACT
Although conceptually not new, ransomware recently re-
gained attraction in the cybersecurity community: notorious
attacks in fact have caused serious damage, proving their
disruptive effect. This is likely just the beginning of a new era.
According to a recent intelligence report by Cybersecurity
Ventures, the total cost due to ransomware attacks is pre-
dicted to exceed $5 billion in 2017. How can this disruptive
threat can be contained? Current anti-ransomware solutions
are effective only against existing threats, and the worst is
yet to come. Cyber criminals will design and deploy more
sophisticated strategies, overcoming current defenses and, as
it commonly happens in security, defenders and attackers
will embrace a competition that will never end. In this arm
race, anticipating how current ransomware will evolve may
help at least being prepared for some future damage.
In this paper, we describe existing techniques to mitigate
ransomware and we discuss their limitations. Discussing
how current ransomware could become even more disruptive
and elusive is crucial to conceive more solid defense and sys-
tems that can mitigate zero-day ransomware, yielding higher
security levels for information systems, including critical in-
frastructures such as intelligent transportation networks and
health institutions.
KEYWORDS
ransomware threat, ransomware mitigation, malware, cyber-
security, survey
1 INTRODUCTION
When installed on a system, a ransomware encrypts files or
blocks functionalities and when the job is done it asks for a
ransom. The victim is left with the choice between paying
up and regain access to the files and functionalities or never
being able to use the system again. The ransom is usually
paid in anonymous cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin [35], leaving
the ominous transactions untraceable by the authorities.
No risk of being seized together with low development effort
have made ransomware a very popular weapon in the arsenal
of cyber criminals. Kaspersky reports that in every 40 seconds
a business is attacked by ransomware and that frequency is
fourfold for individuals [26]. A ransomware is therefore a type
of malware but the nature of ransomware attacks significantly
differ from the ones of conventional malware in terms of the
economical damage and the recoverability. When a system is
infected by a crypto-ransomware variant, the victim’s files
are encrypted using strong cryptography [8] and the recovery
may not be possible. Given this situation even the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reportedly advises victims to
simply pay the ransom [30]. However paying the ransom
may not guarantee to obtain the decryption keys and recover
the files [33].
While Microsoft Windows platform continues to be the
major target of ransomware threat [40], recently a Korean
hosting firm have been hit by a Linux ransomware and had to
pay $1 million [17]. Ransomware are therefore cross-platform,
targeting indiscriminately private citizens and companies,
and able to hit many countries at once indistinguishably.
The infamous WannaCry ransomware recently attacked more
than 200 000 computers in 150 countries [15].
Attacks does not seem to slow down in the near future.
According to a recent intelligence report by Cybersecurity
Ventures, the total cost due to ransomware attacks is pre-
dicted to exceed $5 billion in 2017 [44]. Ransomware threat
is likely to have more consequences than just economical e.g.,
denial of services, downgrade in service quality, lost of social
trust or lost of trust in Information and Communications
Technology (ICT). Ransomware attacks may even cause prob-
lems of civil liability and culminate lawsuits against victim
companies and institutions from customers e.g., by patients
whose care are delayed or hindered. All these circumstances
draw attention of information security community and there
have been several proposals to mitigate ransomware.
In this paper we review current defense techniques for ran-
somware, discussing their strong and weak points. Then, we
discuss what potential strategies could ransomware designer
implement to bypass current countermeasures to continue
causing damage for an extended period: we introduce origi-
nal ransomware variants that employ rootkit techniques and
white-box cryptography, and, inspired by the cybersecurity
incidents occurred in real-world applications, we point out
new possible ransomware targets and attack types.
2 BACKGROUND
Ransomware aims to extort money through preventing access
to data or functionality on victim’s system. Cryptographic
ransomware accomplishes this goal by encrypting files using
strong cryptography [8] while holding the description keys
so that victims are forced to pay the ransom to obtain those
keys and regain access to their files. Another variant, the
locker ransomware, reaches this aim via taking control of
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the victim’s system and denies functionality. In this case,
user data are untouched but the infected system becomes
unusable.
2.1 Defense Systems
Current Mitigations. Existing anti-ransomware applica-
tions, excluding the inefficient and ineffective practice to
back-up and restore files, can be grouped in three main
families. The first includes defences which monitor an appli-
cation’s activity in real time in search for patterns that justify
blocking a potential ransomware from working (behavioral
analysis). The second contains defences that create the con-
ditions to nullify or reverse the effect of a ransomware (key
escrow strategies). The last one includes defences that isolate
the binary of applications and analyze their code in search for
calls to cryptographic operations which would reveal at least
in potential the presence of a malicious intention (detection
of cryptographic primitives). In detail:
• Behavioral analysis: In this approach, ransomware defense
systems examine the behavior of an application and its
interactions with the environment, e.g., file system activity,
network connections and modifications on operating sys-
tem (OS) components. There are various proposals in the
literature that uses behavioral analysis approach. One of
them, Unveil [27] generates an artificial user environment
and monitors desktop lockers, file access patterns and I/O
data entropy. Another one, CryptoDrop [37] observes
file type changes and measures file modifications using
similarity-preserving hash functions and Shannon Entropy
to recognize ransomware. Moreover, ShieldFS [13] moni-
tors low-level file system activities and collects the following
features: folder listing, file read/write/rename, file type
and write entropy. A ransomware is detected by compar-
ing these characteristics with that of benign applications.
Unlike the previous two, ShieldFS can recover the files
which are already encrypted before detection, though this
capability comes with a significant performance overhead.
• Key escrow: In this approach, cryptographic materials gen-
erated by ransomware on the victim’s system are obtained
and held in escrow to later use for recovery. For instance,
PayBreak [28] is a key escrow based mitigation system
and works by intercepting cryptographic Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API), extracting passed parameters
and storing them in a secure key vault. In the case of in-
fection, the defense system tries to decrypt the encrypted
files using the stored keys and parameters. However, this
approach can succeed only if the cryptographic functions
employed by the ransomware are correctly recognized and
the parameters passed to the APIs are logged. While this
is feasible for built-in cryptographic functions on the host
system, ransomware that utilizes third-party libraries can
bypass detection through obfuscation [28] as we will discuss
in Section 3.2.
• Detection of cryptographic primitives: In this approach,
binary programs are analyzed to identify cryptographic
operations in their executable codes. To this goal, [19]
traces the execution of applications and monitors I/O rela-
tionship in the program flow. Based on the occurrences of
bitwise arithmetic instructions and loops, and relationships
between the inputs and outputs of the program routines,
heuristics are applied to recognize the cryptographic algo-
rithms. On the other hand, [31] uses static analysis and
Data Flow Graph (DFG) isomorphisms to identify cryp-
tographic algorithms in the binary programs. Basically,
this technique work as follows: First, the DFG of binary
program is build. Next, the DFG in hand is normalized
using rewrite rules in order to remove the variations due
to complier optimizations. Finally, subgraphs which are
isomorphic to graph signatures of cryptographic algorithms
are searched in the DFG. A match directly flags that the
corresponding algorithm exists in the analyzed program.
Other Methods. The main shortcoming of behavioral anal-
ysis approach for ransomware prevention is the potential false
results due to the lack of an accurate decision mechanisms. In
order to increase the accuracy of detection, anti-ransomware
systems aim to consider more indicators which distinguish
ransomware from benign applications. As the number of rules
increases, simple decision techniques become inadequate. For
this purpose, Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are used to
analyze benign applications and known ransomware samples
to extract feature vectors, build models and classify them.
Recently, a ML based ransomware defense system has been
made commercially available [21]. Meanwhile, the debate over
the security of ML based malware defense systems continues.
For instance, Hu and Tan proposed an algorithm to generate
adversarial examples which cause the ML based malware
detection systems to misclassify the applications [24].
Beside technical solutions, Lu and Liao suggest improving
user awareness to help mitigate ransomware [32]. Security
education for end users would effectively prevent ransomware
attacks originating from phishing or spam emails. However,
the attack surface that ransomware can exploit is far more
larger. As the recent WannaCry attack demonstrates, ran-
somware evolution has enabled it to spread over the network.
Especially, zero-day attacks can amplify the damage of ran-
somware and user education cannot help in this case.
3 POTENTIAL NEW THREATS
We start by giving high-level descriptions of advanced tech-
niques that ransomware may utilize to defeat the defense
systems characterized in the previous section. Next, we point
out new areas that ransomware may exploit and extend the
attack surface that next generation ransomware may target.
In each discussion, our observations are supported by the
real world incidents.
3.1 Rootkit-based Ransomware
Rootkit is a type of malware that has the ability to conceal
its activities on the target computer system, e.g., code execu-
tions, file I/O, network and connections [22]. The capability
of hiding malicious operations is achieved by hooking operat-
ing system’s APIs in order to filter and remove the rootkit’s
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traces, as depicted in Figure 1. Since a rootkit clears its
footprints from APIs that inspect file and memory access,
the rootkits are harder to detect than other types of malware.
ReadFile()Application
NtReadFile()kernel32.dll
SYSENTER (x86)
or SYSCALL (x64)ntdll.dll
NtReadFile()ntoskrnl.exe
I/O Manager Rootkit
File System
Driver Stack
User mode
Kernel mode
Figure 1: Interception of read calls by a kernel mode
rootkit in order to hide its trace.
Hooking system APIs can be accomplished in several ways,
including changing the function addresses in Import Address
Table (IAT), patching System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT)
in kernel level, and injecting code into applications (DLL
injection) [39]. Starting from Windows Server 2003, x64-
based versions of Windows platform introduced Kernel Patch
Protection (KPP) which forces kernel mode drivers to be dig-
itally signed, hence prevents unknown modification of code
or critical structures in Windows kernel [34]. Nevertheless,
cybercriminals frequently used stolen certificates to sign mal-
ware in order to penetrate this defense [9, 41]. Ransomware
authors also seems to have this capability. A recent Virus-
Total report shows that a sample of Razy ransomware has a
valid digital signature [45].
Implementations of current ransomware defense approaches
deeply rely on the security guarantees of the host OSes. While
increasing the bar for cybercriminals, state-of-the-art ran-
somware defense systems utilizes user mode hooks or kernel
mode drivers to monitor behavior of applications and stop
ransomware [13, 27, 28, 37]. Although there is currently no
known ransomware which utilizes the advanced techniques of
rootkits, the aforementioned defense systems may not detect
a rootkit-based ransomware.
3.2 Obfuscation
Obfuscation is the practice of making a software implementa-
tion incomprehensible through a sequence of transformations
while preserving the program semantics [12]. Originally, le-
gitimate vendors utilized obfuscation to protect intellectual
property in software implementation. However, malware au-
thors also take advantage of obfuscation to conceal malicious
executable code in the binary programs. Concordantly, ob-
fuscated malware can evade from signature based detection
techniques which is one of the oldest approaches in the battle
with malware.
push rbp
mov rbp, rsp
mov WORD PTR [rbp-2], 1
mov WORD PTR [rbp-4], 2
movzx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-2]
movzx edx, WORD PTR [rbp-4]
imul eax, edx
mov WORD PTR [rbp-6], ax
movsx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-6]
pop rbp
ret
push rbp
mov rbp, rsp
mov WORD PTR [rbp-2], 1
mov WORD PTR [rbp-4], 2
movzx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-2]
add eax, 1
mov WORD PTR [rbp-2], ax
and WORD PTR [rbp-2], 32767
movzx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-2]
sub eax, 1
mov WORD PTR [rbp-2], ax
and WORD PTR [rbp-4], 32767
movzx edx, WORD PTR [rbp-4]
movzx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-2]
imul eax, edx
mov WORD PTR [rbp-6], ax
movsx eax, WORD PTR [rbp-6]
pop rbp
ret
Figure 2: Two code fragments that are semanti-
cally equivalent and multiply the integers 1 and 2.
Left, the original function. Right, the transformed
function by adding ineffective instructions shown in-
side red boxes. Note that the code’s appearance is
changed while keeping its behavior same.
Obfuscating malware can be categorized into four types:
encrypting, oligomorphic, polymorphic and metamorphic mal-
ware [48]. The members of the first type encrypts malicious
code segment in the binary program and decrypt it in the
runtime. This involves a decryptor function embedded in
the malware body to decrypt and execute the malicious
code. Anti-malware systems, though, would still recognize
the decryptor function and identify malicious software. Thus,
the second type, oligomorphic malware, carries a set of en-
crypted decryptors in data segment of binary and changes
the decryptor in each generation. However, the number of
decryptors is limited and therefore all of them eventually gets
identified by anti-malware systems. On the other hand, poly-
morphic malware mutates its decryption engine randomly,
hence evades signature based detection. The means of mu-
tation include dead code insertion, register reassignment,
subroutine reordering, instructor substitution, code transpo-
sition & integration. For instance, dead code insertion is the
practice of adding code that has no effect on the functionality
of the software and is shown in Figure 2. For the details of
other techniques, we refer the reader to [2]. Anti-malware
vendors developed sandboxing approach to help detection,
which works by observing the program’s behavior in a safe
environment. Once the polymorphic malware is executed
in sandbox and the constant malicious part is decrypted
in the memory, signature based detection can be applied.
The race between cybercriminals and anti-malware vendors
resulted the appearance of metamorphic malware which ac-
tively recognizes, parses and mutates its whole body. As
it does not contain a constant body, and thus cannot be
detected via signature analysis [7], metamorphic malware has
been considered to be most dangerous type.
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In the ransomware side, the situation seems to be safe for
now. As of today, there is no known instance of obfuscated
ransomware through aforementioned techniques. Contempo-
rary ransomware utilizes binary packers, e.g., UPX1, ASPack2
or PEtite3, which are used to compress the compiled code in
order to make the size of executable even smaller. However,
malware authors do not confine themselves to well-known
packers, often write their own obfuscator routines and uti-
lize combined packers [43]. This multi-layer protection may
hinder defense systems based on API monitoring (if third
party crypto libraries statically linked) and sandboxing. In
the case of an unlucky event of infection, such a ransomware
can be devastating.
3.3 White-Box Cryptography
White-box cryptography is the concept of protecting the sen-
sitive data hard-coded in a software implementation [10, 11].
In particular, main focus of this domain is to embed secret
keys into the source code in such a way that it is hard to
extract them from compiled binary. An example of a Feistel
network based block cipher and its fixed-key white-box im-
plementation are illustrated in Figure 3. Although white-box
cryptography is not a new idea (it is first introduced in 2002),
no secure white-box implementation of the block cipher AES
exists yet, for instance, previous proposals are found to be
open to key extraction and table-decomposition attacks [5].
Nevertheless, white-box cryptography still continues to be
an active field of research [3, 6, 25].
key plaintext
ciphertext
plaintext
ciphertext
Figure 3: Left, a block cipher algorithm based on
Feistel network structure. Right, a white-box imple-
mentation of that block cipher where a key is hard-
coded into the algorithm.
Currently, ransomware implementations cannot protect
the secret keys in the memory during the encryption process.
Using this weakness, defense systems can extract these keys
using various techniques. For instance, a key escrow like
approach monitors calls to known cryptographic APIs (either
1Ultimate Packer for eXecutables, https://upx.github.io/
2ASPack, http://www.aspack.com/aspack.html
3PEtite, http://www.un4seen.com/petite/
built in or third party) and stores parameters of encryption
functions in a vault [28]. In virtual environments, point-in-
time snapshot of memory would also reveal those keys and
recovery could be possible. Furthermore, some ransomware
families encrypt victim’s files using a key which is hard-coded
in the ransomware body [29]. In this case, binary analysis
can be utilized to search for static encryption keys in the
compiled code. In other words, one can interact with the
ransomware and propose solutions if the encryption keys
resides unprotected in the memory. That being said, key
extraction from securely implemented white-box algorithms
is meant to be hard. Therefore, introducing of secure white-
box implementations of block ciphers can tip the balance in
favor of ransomware authors.
3.4 Ransomware of Things
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the interconnected network
of physical devices that can communicate over the Inter-
net [20]. An IoT device can be equipped with electronic
components, firmware, software, various types of sensors to
collect information and actuators that allows to interact with
the physical environment. Besides electronic devices like tele-
visions, mobile phones and surveillance systems, in today’s
world, cars, planes, buildings, kitchen gadgets and even toys
are also connected to the web.
IoT devices has been a part of our daily lives for a long time
and can be seen virtually everywhere. However, IoT devices
are inherently resource-constrained (CPU with low clock
rate, small memory size). As such, the available options for
cryptographic algorithms to use is limited when designing a
secure communication protocol [49]. The security issues with
IoT have always been a concern in information community [1],
most importantly access control problems.
Given that the vulnerabilities in IoT devices and the high
motivation of cyber criminals, there have already occurred
several alarming and threatening ransomware incidents as
follows. Hackers took control of ticket machines of San Fran-
sisco’s public transportation network and claimed ransom [47].
Furthermore in Austria, a hotel had to pay ransom after a
ransomware infected its management system and blocked
generating new cards [4]. Researchers demonstrated a proof-
of-concept that the control of an Internet-enabled thermostat
can be taken by a ransomware, allowing them to change
the heating settings [42]. Similarly, A recent security report
states that cybercriminals launched a Permanent Denial of
Service (PDoS) attack on IoT devices which wipes all data
on the device and destroy its firmware and/or basic functions,
causing a permanent corruption [36].
By extending the attack surface and lack of adequate secu-
rity, IoT has a potential of opening doors to novel ransomware
attacks. For example, researchers demonstrated that it is pos-
sible to take control of a car and remotely stop it [18]. Also,
another group of researchers showed that 75% of bluetooth
smart door locks can be wirelessly hacked [46]. Given these
facts, it is reasonable to ask the following questions: Consider
that your car was remotely stopped in a rural area. Would
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you pay the ransom to re-activate the car’s engine? Likewise,
when you return your home in the middle of the night and
see that your door is locked. Would you pay the ransom to
go in your home? The picture may become worse for the
enterprises, as the ransom amounts can be set higher and
this makes the enterprises a more plausible target for cyber
criminals. But the negative effects of a ransomware attack is
beyond the money: the damage in the reputation and work
loss should also be counted. Taking into the account that the
security flaws in IoT devices do not seem to be fixed soon, or
even fixable [38], ransomware attacks may gravitate towards
IoT in the near future.
3.5 Socio Technical Attacks
The ultimate goal of cyber-criminals is to obtain money as
much as possible. To achieve this, they can become very cre-
ative and employ novel marketing strategies. In one of these,
a ransomware variant called Popcorn Time offers an option
to victims who want to get decryption keys without paying.
The condition is first victim infects other two ones and these
two victims pay the ransom. Then, the first victim obtains
the keys. The initial samples of Popcorn Time ransomware
have an encryption key embedded in the malware body [14].
Although the key can be extracted from the current sample
of Popcorn Time and files can be recovered for now, previ-
ous evolution of ransomware suggests that future samples of
Popcorn Time may become more effective.
To this day, the vast majority of famous ransomware fami-
lies share the same principle. Extortion by holding decryption
keys can be expected to succeed when its vital for victims
to regain access to their data. However, on the other side
of medallion, there is another fact. Some data may need to
be kept private such that when leaked, data owner may lose
advantage and/or have economical damage. Thus, another
way to extort victims can be to exfiltrate sensitive data and
ask for a ransom to not make it public. These data types
may include trading secrets, financial records, medical his-
tory, government documents, details of high-tech projects,
blue-prints of critical infrastructures, and internal/private
communications. For example, the disclosure of data breaches
reduced the purchase price of Yahoo by $350 million when it
is acquired by Verizon [16]. It comes to mind that, instead of
selling the leaked data in the underground market, hackers
can try to claim a ransom to get a higher revenue. Another
attack hit Sony Pictures, hackers compromised the comput-
ers and released sensitive data including company’s financial
records and e-mail messages of executives [23]. The contents
of the breach put the company in a difficult situation so that
one may ask the question: Would Sony Pictures pay a ransom
if attackers demand it?
Lastly, we would like to point an important difference
between extortion via encryption and data exfiltration. In
the former case, the instance of threat comes to an end when
the victims regain access to their files. In contrast, no one
can guarantee that could retain cyber-criminals from asking
for ransom again in the latter case. In this situation, it
would be safe to expect that extortion via stealing sensitive
information may be an increasing trend in the near future
and prepare the network infrastructures against this threat.
4 CONCLUSION
Ransomware is a class of malware whose goal is to extort
money, a goal that is facilitated by current anonymous curren-
cies which guarantee to cyber-criminals to be paid without be-
ing traced. Then we need solid defense systems against what
can easily degenerate in a pandemia of digital crimes. How-
ever, unlike conventional anti-malware systems, ransomware
mitigation does not tolerate mistake. If the ransomware
is implemented properly and the attack succeeds, then the
damage taken may be irreversible.
Existing ransomware mitigation systems are build upon
the analysis of collected samples but a better strategy is to
anticipate the future, and be prepared for the ransomware
that will come. In this respect, we described possible threats
that ransomware may pose by relying on novel techniques,
like root-kit, obfuscation, and white-box, not yet adopted in
real attack as well as by targeting critical domains, such as the
Internet of Things and the Socio-Technical systems, which
will worrisomely amplify the effectiveness of ransomware
attacks. Our research is timely, since it is known that we must
design products keeping security in mind, not integrating after
whereas network infrastructures must be carefully configured
and fully patched in order to prevent ransomware attacks
through data exfiltration. We hope that our observations
help developing and building more robust defense systems
against ransomware threat.
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